Background

On February 13, 2024, a high-profile internal server hosting core financial records of IMakeFinanceEasy Pvt Ltd was confirmed compromised.

The server was an internal server with no internet access and was in a segmented network. It seemed highly improbable unless it was an insider threat. The server, though of high impact, was treated as low risk due to network isolation.

Post-Incident Analysis

  • The compromise occurred using a legitimate administrative account and there was no exploitation of perimeter vulnerabilities.
  • No malware was introduced from the internet; access patterns initially appeared "authorised".
  • The breach did not resemble an external attack.

Forensic Review Revealed

  • The unauthorised activity had been ongoing for approximately two months.
  • Attackers did not access the server directly — access was achieved through lateral movement inside the environment.
  • An internal user account was used as the initial foothold. That account already had elevated access on multiple internal systems.
  • Through internal trust relationships, attackers reached the admin account used on the server.
  • The privileges already existed — this did not require privilege escalation through technical exploitation.

The Breakthrough Finding

The internal account used for lateral movement belonged to:

  • An employee who had left the organisation five months earlier
  • A senior individual with broad access across systems
  • A user whose credentials were still valid and trusted internally

When contacted during the investigation, the former employee confirmed no involvement and had not logged in since leaving the company.

Reality Gap

From a human perspective, the identity was gone. From a system perspective, the identity was still alive.

The Core Puzzle

  1. How did a server with no internet access get compromised?
  2. How did attackers obtain an admin account without exploiting vulnerabilities?
  3. Why did internal monitoring not flag the activity for months?
  4. How did an account of a departed employee remain active across systems?
  5. Who was responsible for ensuring that identity access was fully revoked?
Question

As a GRC practitioner, what are the most likely governance breakdowns behind this story? Where do you expect the missing decision rights and ownership to be?

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